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THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OF
SEVERAL STATES TO DEAL JOINTLY
WITH SOCIAL AND LABOR
PROBLEMS*
WILLIAM

J.

DONOVAN

N CONSIDERING the use of interstate compacts to solve the social
and labor problems common to more than one state, the question is
not whether there shall be governmental control.' Today there is such
control of many social and labor conditions, and from present indications we will continue to have it. The real question is: What agency is
to assume that control?
All problems cannot be divided into the formal classification of
state or national. Today we realize that the social and labor conditions
of one state may have an effect upon business conducted in anotherj
state. Often these conditions are sectional rather than national in scope.
For solution of many of the social and labor issues of our present industrial life a middle ground must be found. It must be one that will
avoid the excesses of centralized control, with all its dangerous consequences, and at the same time be one which will provide an effective
method of handling problems affecting two or more states. This is the
goal toward which we strive. Where the problems are regional, federal
or individual state legislation is often unsatisfactory.
However, the difficulties in this method must be considered. State
problems heretofore solved by use of regional compacts are different in
nature as well as complexity from the problems arising out of social
and labor conditions. 2 The effectiveness of permanent state compacts
in adjusting these latter problems concerning several states is yet unknown. The mere fact that interstate compacts have been an available
and satisfactory remedy in the past for disputes involving water rights,
boundaries, etc., does not mean that they are a cure for our present-day
social and labor troubles.
There are constitutional limitations upon the use of the compacts in
certain types of problems, just as there are such restrictions upon federal or state action. But in fields where the federal government cannot
act because of the absense of interstate commerce or other constitu*Delivered at the meeting of the Wisconsin Bar Association, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, November 20, 1935.
1 See Wilson, Industrial and Labor Adjustments by Intrastate Compacts, (1935)
20 MARQ. L. REv. 11.
2 See pamphlet by Delph Carpenter on Interstate River Compacts and Frankfurter and Landis, A Study in Interstate Adjustments, (1925) 34 YALE L. J.
730, for lists of such compacts.
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tional power, the regional compact is often the only means of solving
uniformly certain of these problems.3 In general, such compacts, so far
as applicable to social and labor conditions merely would remove the
question of interstate or local commerce from the problem. However,
in many situations there still remain other constitutional restrictions
upon the use of interstate compacts. What one state cannot do within
its own sphere by itself it cannot do with another similar state merely
because the United States has consented. The Constitution places restrictions upon the state and federal governments for the benefit of
the people which only they can alienate.
II.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LIMITATIONS

IMPOSED

BY

THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS

It cannot be assumed that by means of state compacts the states
have omnipotent power to deal with all social and working conditions
within their borders. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments place
fairly well-defined constitutional limitations upon certain types of governmental action. Without authority, express or implied, in the Constitution the federal government cannot act. Some problems the state
can deal with only because of its police powers. The Supreme Court
has found it difficult on more than one occasion to define the boundary
of the police power beyond which its exercise becomes an invasion of
the guaranty of liberty of person and freedom of contract under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The use of the compact insofar as
social and labor questions are concerned encounters the same difficulty.
The question is still open as to the extent of the power which the
national and state government possess in dealing with certain problems
pertaining to labor and social conditions. While the compact can unify
the efforts of state governments, it cannot create power in them which
they do not already possess. In determining the effectiveness of the
compact method of adjusting such disputes we must consider the nature
and extent of the constitutional authority as it has been defined and
clarified by judicial decisions.

3 Uniform state laws passed separately by each state often may reach the desired
result. However, in this method the necessity of permanency is lacking. An
interstate compact probably would be so binding on each state involved as to
prevent one from withdrawing during the contracting period. See Green v.
Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 69, 5 L.ed. 547 (1823).
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INTERSTATE COMPACTS RELATIVE TO

HOURS OF EMPLOYMENT

More than twenty years ago, in the case of W. C. Ritchie & Co. v.
Wayman,4 it was decided that a law fixing an eight-hour day for
women in industry was unconstitutional. The basis of this decision was
that such a restriction violated the liberty of an individual to use his
time and talents in any way he saw fit. As industrial life became more
complex and the actual handicaps of women in industry were realized,
the attitude of the courts as to legislation dealing with hours of work
for women changed.
There is a long line of cases upholding legislative limitations upon
the freedom of employers to contract with women in industry." These
cases are based upon the theory that the great mass of women workers
cannot secure terms of employment needful from the point of view of
public welfare unless they are aided by legislation.
The validity of legislation prescribing how long men shall work is
more doubtful. In Holdewv. Hardy,6 the Supreme Court held that the
length of time any person, regardless of age or sex, may be employed
in dangerous occupations was a matter to be determined by reasonable
legislation of state governments. This case related to workers employed
in mining and smelting, where conditions of employment bear directly
and substantially upon the health of the workers. Because the health
of the employee is a concern coming within the police power of the
state, the legislation in this case is properly outside the restrictions of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. But in Lochner v. New York,7
the Court concluded that a law restricting those employed in bakeries to
ten hours a day was an arbitrary and invalid interference with the
liberty of contract secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. Later, in
Bunting v. Oregon,8 the Supreme Court upheld an act regulating the
hours of labor and prescribing a maximum of ten hours a day for any
person, whether man or woman, working in any mill, factory, or manufacturing establishment. The law had been attacked upon the ground
that it constituted an attempt to fix wages. That contention was rejected
4244 IlI. 509, 91 N.E. 695 (1910).
5 See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324, 52 L.ed. 551 (1908);
Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671, 34 Sup. Ct. 469, 58 L.ed. 788 (1914);
Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 44 Sup. Ct. 425, 68 L.ed. 690 (1924).
6169 U.S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L.ed. 780 (1898).
7 198 U.S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L.ed. 537 (1905).
8243 U.S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435, 61 L.ed. 830 (1917). See also Northern Pacific
Railway Co. v. Washington, 222 U.S. 370, 32 Sup. Ct. 160, 56 L. ed. 237 (1912),
in effect sustaining the Federal Hours of Labor Law of 1907. In Bosley v.
McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385, 35 Sup. Ct. 345, 59 L.ed. 632 (1915), because of
the importance to the public that the services be performed by those not suffering from over-fatigue, limitation on the hours of labor of pharmacists was
held proper.
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and the act sustained as a reasonable health regulation pertaining to
hours of service.9
It is clear, therefore, that a state can make reasonable regulations
relative to the hours of labor of children and women employed in industry. As the law now exists, reasonable regulations of hours or wages
may also be made applicable to men employed in dangerous industries
or occupations directly involving the public health. In both cases, however, the legislation must be in fact a police power regulation reasonably adapted to that end. 10 Two or more states, in consequence, by
interstate compacts may enact uniform regulations pertaining to hours
of service provided these regulations can be termed valid health regulations. However, when one state, or two or more states by an interstate compact, make such laws or compacts pertaining to maximum
hours of labor which cannot be sustained under the police powers, the
compact and the laws would be invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment as infringing upon the rights of employers and employees.

B. STATE COMPACTS RELATING TO WAGES
As to the regulation of wages and the attempt to establish a minimum standard, there is greater difficulty. The war-time case of Wilson
v. New," upholding the Adamson Act, casts doubt upon the power of
the federal government to regulate wages paid railway employees
engaged in interstate commerce. While the act in that case was upheld,
the case involved an industry which was affected with the public interest, and in addition it dealt with an emergency of an unusually serious
character. That case involved a labor dispute in which the two parties
refused to come to an agreement as to wages. The result of this refusal
was to affect interstate commerce directly. It was the threat to that
commerce which gave Congress its power to act, and having acquired
jurisdiction in this manner, it derived the right to fix wages in this
particular industry in interstate commerce.
Because of the language of the Court, there still remains doubt as
to whether the federal government has power to fix wages in industries
9 Chief Justice Taft in his dissenting opinion in Adkins v. Children's Hospital,

261 U.S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L.ed. 785 (1923), was of the opinion that the
Bunting case overruled the Lochner case sub silentio. Not being able to reconcile the substantial distinction between a minimum wage law and a maximum
hour law in limiting the freedom of contract, he contended that a restriction
as to one is no greater in essence than the other and is of the same kind.
20 Legislation regulating hours of labor on public works is sustained without
regard to police power. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 24 Sup. Ct. 124, 48 L.ed.
148 (1903). See also Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 36 Sup. Ct. 78. 60 L.ed. 206
(1915); Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246, 27 Sup. Ct. 600, 51 L.ed. 1047

(1907).

11243 U.S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61 L.ed. 755 (1917), upholding as constitutional
Act of September 3, 5, 1916, c. 436, 39 STAT. 721, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 65, 66 (1935).
See also Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of IndustrialRelations, 262 U.S.
522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L.ed. 1103 (1923).
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engaged in interstate commerce, and even in utilities operating in such
commerce, unless a serious threat to the interruption of such commerce
can be shown to arise out of the character of the wages being paid. 2
Apparently similar restrictions are placed upon the power of the states
to fix minimum wages.
It was thought in 1916.that the constitutional powers of the several
states to regulate wage payments within their borders had been established by the cases of Stettler v. O'Hara and Simpson v. O'Hara.13
These cases upheld an Oregon statute fixing minimum wages for
women and minors. Other labor laws restricting wage contracts of
employment had also been upheld. Thus, employers of miners had been
required to pay for coal by weight before screening.' 4 Employers had
been required to redeem cash store orders accepted by their employees
in payment.'" Payment of salaries in advance had been prohibited.'6
While some of these laws did not impose a minimum in wages, they did
take away from the employee the freedom to agree as to how his wages
should be fixed, in what medium they should be paid, and when they
should be paid.
But in 1923, in Adkins v. Children's Hospital,7 the Supreme Court
held invalid the Minimum Wage Act of 1918 fixing minimum wage
standards for adult women in any occupation in the District of Columbia. In holding that the act interfered with the liberty of contract, the
Court made a number of statements which indicated limits to legislative authority in fixing wages.
In support of the constitutionality of the Minimum Wage Act, it
was urged that the due process clauses impose a standard of fair dealing to be applied to the myriad variety of facts which are involved in
modern legislation, and that the Supreme Court had interpreted that
standard to mean freedom from arbitrary or wanton interference and
protection against spoliation of property. On the other side it was
urged that if every law which expediency may suggest may be called
a public health or public welfare law and thus become an exercise of
police power, the restrictions on the action of the legislative body completely break down, and in effect the legislatures would be permitted
to amend the Constitution under the guise of the exercise of police
12 See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837, 79

L.ed. 888 (1935).
13243 U.S. 629, 37 Sup. Ct. 475, 61 L.ed. 937 (1917). This case was decided by
an evenly divided Court without opinion.
'4McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 29 Sup. Ct. 206, 53 L.ed. 315 (1909).
's Knoxville Iron,Co. v. Harbinson, 183 U.S. 13, 22 Sup. Ct. 1, 46 L.ed. 45 (1901).
16 Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 23 Sup. Ct. 821, 47 L.ed. 1002 (1902).
The statute here involved curtailed the payment of a seaman's wages in

advance. It was sustained because of the proneness of seamen to squander
their wages before sailing.
U.S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L.ed. 785 (1923).

37"261
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power. It is submitted that neither of these statements represents the
true test of constitutionality of an attempted exercise of police power.
The proper test would seem to be whether or not the act in question
is in fact designed to protect the health of employees or to be otherwise
within the police power of the state; whether it is reasonably adapted
to that purpose; and whether it sets up a standard sufficiently definite
and certain for administration. The distinctions made in the cases
between hours and wages are pointed out by Mr. Justice Holmes in his
dissenting opinion as distinctions of degree. However, it would seem
proper that the regulation of wages, as well as hours, might well be
directed solely to the necessary protection of health and would, therefore, be a valid exercise of police power.
By basing legislation on a different set of premises than existed in
the Adkins case, it may be possible to overcome the objections which
the Supreme Court had to that act.' 8 Such a law was attempted in New
York about two years ago.19 This law recites that women are under
particularly serious disadvantage in bargaining with employers and that
the wage standards which are set up under the law are based'on a wide
variety of facts which must be considered by special boards sitting in
respect to particular industries. These boards hold public hearings in
which employer, employee, and the public present their views. This
law has been held constitutional by one of the lower courts in New
York State.2 0 The decision relied upon the considerations which have
been indicated above and, in addition, upon the fact that emergency
brought about by the depression evoked the power to enact reasonable
wage standards.
It is conceivable that in some such manner as this the Adkins
decision may be qualified, if not reversed by the Supreme Court itself.
If this should happen it could well be that interstate compacts would
be workable instruments for the regulation of wages of women and
children both in local and interstate commerce.2 1 While this has not yet
been determined, it may well be that in the future a doctrine will be
liberalized along the lines of the Bunting decision in regard to hours of
employment.
The industrial development of recent years, which has given rise
to widespread demand for governmental control of wages and hours
' 8 There the statute provided for a wage based on the needs of the employee
rather than upon the value of the services rendered and the ability of the
employer to pay. The act set up arbitrary rates of wages.
19 New York Labor Law, Art. 19 (1933). See Note (1933) 43 YALE L. f. 1250
for discussion of this statute.
20 People ex rel Tipaldo v. Morehead, Sup. Ct. Kings County (June 26, 1935).
21 In such a situation there apparently would be no inherent restriction on a
similar law pertaining to men employed in industry. Such legislation as to men
workers apparently would have to have a more substantial relation to the need
of the exercise of health or other police power as concerns men workers.
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of employment, may conceivably provide a basis for a change in the

attitude of the courts. In the meantime, however, ive must recognize
certain limitations placed upon the governmental power to regulate
generally hours of labor or wage standards. Legislatures have such
power so far as women and children are concerned by appropriate and
reasonable laws within the police power. Similar control may be exer-

cised where men are employed in dangerous industries or on public
works. But unless a given law is a direct health or safety measure, a
state cannot regulate constitutionally the hours of labor or wages of
men in ordinary industries and pursuits. Under such a constitutional

limitation, a state cannot do by interstate compact what is denied to
it to do alone.
Whatever jurisdiction the federal government may enjoy in these
matters depends upon the interstate commerce clause or some other
federal power in certain situations. The validity of the regulation of

the payment of wages and of the fixing of hours by the federal government depends upon whether such wages or hours substantially and
directly affect the flow of interstate commerce. The recent decision of
the Supreme Court in the Schechter case 22 settles this question.
C.

STATE COMPACTS FOR OTHER SOCIAL PLANS

The authority of the national and state governments within their
respective jurisdictions to control child labor, to establish old age
unemployment insurance, and to require employers to bargain with
their employees collectively are further questions which arise. In certain instances the state constitutions have been considered by state
courts to prevent certain types of such legislation. These decisions
present peculiar local problems which can be taken care of in many
cases by proper amendments to state constitutions, where such amendments prove necessary.
The problems that we meet in these fields are political and economic
more than constitutional. They center around the fact that any effort
to set up particular standards in any part less than the whole of a
territory in which a given industry operates runs the danger of opposition in that territory which is placed at a competitive disadvantage.
Also, even in an entire territory a given industry regulated by inter-"
23
state compacts may migrate to unregulated regions.
As to certain social and labor questions, when the states have not
enacted uniform laws or entered into interstate compacts the federal
U.S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct.:837, 79 L.ed. 888 (1935).
illustration of these problems is the expansion of the bituminous coal
mining industry into states south of the Ohio River at a time when production capacity.was quite. adequate in the older fields, A consideration -of the, rise
of the textile industry in the South also is an illustration of this fact.

22295
23An
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government has attempted to impose national regulation. The failure
of the states to pass adequate child labor laws inevitably led to the
attempt by Congress to solve this question. In the Child Labor Tax
Case2' it was held that the taxing power of Congress could not be used
to equalize the discrepancy which resulted from the enactment of child
labor laws in one state without their enactment in another competitive
state. Such attempt by Congress was held unconstitutional as being in
substance an attempt to regulate interstate commerce through the use
of the taxing power. The first child labor case, Hammer v. Ddgenhart,2
had declared unconstitutional a federal statute purporting to exclude
from interstate commerce articles manufactured by the use of child
labor. This statute had been passed with the thought that it was similar
in principle to the Webb-Kenyon Act, which in pre-prohibition days
prevented the shipment of liquor into states in which its sale had been
forbidden. The Webb-Kenyon Act was upheld in Adams Express Co.
v. Kentucky.26 The Court placed great emphasis on the fact that in that
case the particular article involved was inherently of an injurious character, the sale of which had been forbidden. One of the points of
difference between the Hammer and the Adams cases was that in the
Hammer case exports from the state of origin rather than imports into
the state of destination were prohibited. This diffeience was necessary
because it is obvious that without it the manufacturers in the states
which have child labor laws would be at a disadvantage everywhere
except in their own state.
We may speculate on the basis of later decisions and changed circumstances as to whether the Hammer case may be qualified by the
Supreme Court in the future. It cannot be said with any degree of
security that such a qualification will be made.
It is clear, however, that a state by itself may validly impose under
its police power regulations involving child labor. In like manner, several states by interstate compacts may solve this question among themselves. The establishment of uniform old age and unemployment insurance systems also are matters which normally come within the proper
sphere of state action. Regional compacts on such matters may prevent migration of employees and establish equal competitive advantages
of businesses in the respective states.

III
CONSIDERATIONS IN

MAKING INTERSTATE COMPACTS EFFECTIVE,

We must recognize that one state may seek, for political or economic motives, to take advantage of another and thus impede the use
U.S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct. 449, 66 L.ed. 817 (1922)..
25247 U.S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 599, 62 L.ed. 101 (1918).
26238 U.S. 190, 35 Sup. Ct. 824, 59 L.ed. 1267 (1915).
24259

.
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of a compact in regard to social and labor conditions. This difficulty
was encountered in the Colorado River compact, involving water rights
of the adjacent states.
One way to avoid this danger is to so draft these compacts that the
abstention of one state will not preclude the compact from going into
effect in the states which ratify it, thus making it possible for a single
recalcitrant state to hold back legislation over a large area for a long
time.
This brings us to a consideration of the minimum wage compact
with respect to women and children in industry which has been signed
by the commissioners of seven of the important industrial states in the
East, and which has been ratified by the legislatures of New Hampshire and Massachusetts. 27 This compact provides, as it has been suggested a properly drafted compact should provide, that it should go
into effect in the ratifying states without regard to the abstention of
other states which might refuse to sign, ratify, or enact legislation.
This compact is a pioneering effort. Like most pioneering efforts,
it is not perfect. Its drafters were obliged to proceed carefully, partly
because of the underlying constitutional limitations which I have
already discussed and partly in view of the economic and political situations which we have in mind. The compact was designed to make possible minimum wage legislation of the character of the New York
statute which has been mentioned before. It does not establish any
fixed interstate or local rates in any industry. The states to the compact
merely agree that they will enact legislation to prevent unjust and
oppressive wage rates affecting women and children. State commissions somewhat similar to those which have been heretofore set up
in New York under the New York Minimum Wage Law are provided
for in this compact. A supervising interstate commission, but without
compulsory powers of any kind, is likewise set up.
The experience in NeNw York has been that, because of the procedural complexities and the difficulty of obtaining sufficient funds, the
establishment of these minimum wage standards in the various industries proceeds slowly. But this, of course, is essentially a procedural
problem, and one which can be remedied easily if the legislature desires
to do so. However, there is no strong guaranty that this type of interstate compact will produce sufficient uniformity of minimum wage
standards in each of the states which is a party to the compact. This
again will depend in considerable part on the extent to which business
men realize the importance of establishing reasonable standards by
regional action in order to avert the imminent federal control which
27 See Reports Nos. 1325, 1641, and 1850 of the Commission on Interstate Com-

pacts Affecting Labor and Industries to the General Court of Massachusetts.
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almost certainly will be assumed if they fail to take advantage of these
opportunities.
It also depends not only on the extent to which compacts are made
to operate effectively within the states which ratify them, but also on
the extent to which they are actually signed and ratified by other states
and the extent to which legislation is passed under them by sufficient
states to make it possible to regulate regional industries as a whole.
That these problems are quite real must not be overlooked. The
extent to which they affect the usefulness of the interstate compact has
been made clear not only by the compact signed by the northeastern
states with regard to minimum wages for women, but also by the failure to agree last summer upon compacts concerning child labor and
maximum hours. In the case of the latter proposal an effort was made
to establish a uniform standard of about forty hours a week. The
procedure was thus somewhat different from that adopted with regard
to minimum wages, where the precise wage to be paid was left to each
state. The various commissioners could not agree that forty hours was
not too stringent a regulation, and in consequence action was deferred
on this proposal. If, on the other hand, a flexible compact had been
agreed upon which left to each state the right to determine the maximum hours of employment, the problem would have been partially
solved.
IV
CONSTITUTIONAL

AMENDMENT

TO MAKE INTERSTATE COMPACTS

EFFECTIVE

It must be expected that those who advocate amendment to the
Federal Constitution as the only way by which social and labor legislation may be surely achieved will be quick to point out all the disadvan-

tages which we have discussed. Unless industry is ready to search out
and act upon every opportunity which develops to make the interstate
compact a workable instrument of self-government, then it should
abandon 0l pretense of an effort to meet the popular demand and
need for legislation by this means.
The processes of democracy are slow. It is our belief that this

slowness of democratic action is amply compensated for by the soundness and the justness of the results which are ordinarily achieved in
due course of time by such democratic methods. If, however, in the
face of the strong beliefs of many people that social and labor legislation of the kind we have been discussing is imperatively necessary, and
if, in the face of their determination to obtain such legislation, proposals are made to that end which, though workable, are not made to
work, not only will the proposals themselves be discarded in time, but
also thor faith in democratic processes will be weakened.
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It is a fundamental proposition, therefore, that if the interstate
compact is to accomplish the purposes which we hope it may acconiplish, each state and the business men of each state must earnestly
endeavor to forget their particular interests to the extent that.it is
possible for them to join hands in working out their common' problem.
Moreover, politics as such must be allowed to play no part in the conferences which may be called to set up compacts or in the committees
which may be appointed to administer the interstate and intrastate
application of the laws passed pursuant to such compacts.
If, in the negotiations which take place in an endeavor to adopt
interstate compacts pertaining to social and labor conditions, it beeom'es
apparent that the constitutional -barriers which I have pointed out are
impassable, then we should not hesitate to examine the possibilities -of
an amendment to the Federal Constitution of such a nature as to permit
interstate compacts in the labor legislation field. Such an amendment
will not enlarge the powers of the federal government. My concern as
to the alteration of the Constitution does not relate, to the mere fact
of alteration. The Constitution was never intended to. be and hs *hot
been a fixed and rigid instrument. This is indicated not only' by the
changing interpretations of its provisions, but also by the long "list*of
amendments. My concern is with the extension of the federal :control
which may be set up by such an amendment. We should avoid the
dangers inherent in a centralized bureaucracy, with the political spoils
upon which it may lay its hands, with its ignorance. of. and lack of
interest in local conditions, and with the extraneous considerations
which bear upon the judgment of legislators when local or regional
problems are made the subject of national political bargaining.
It is for these reasons that amendments should not be passed, which
would permit Congress to regulate without restriction all industries
over any territory and over all subjects which it might consider related
to social welfare. But an amendment permitting the adoption of social
legislation by the states by means of the procedure already ayilable
under the interstate compact clause of the Federal Constitution would
be another matter. If such an amendment proves nece.ssary to make the
interstate compact work, then it should be considered with due .care.
The solution of regional problems should be on a regional basis,
subject to the qualifications pointed out above: first, that the .coinstitutional authority of the state and federal gover.nments.a cting togethr
must be ascertained and, if necessary, established; an'd second, that the
will to cooperative action must exist in the states and in the industries
of those states. It is believed that the interstate compagt wil l'prov.t.o
be a just and workable instrument .in the field of socia. PnLd laour
legislation.
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